Abstract I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her audience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade a majority of the electorate in order to win an election. I find that senders can gain credibility by speaking truthfully to some receivers while lying to others. In general settings, the model admits information transmission in equilibrium for some prior beliefs. The sender can approximate her preferred outcome when the fraction of the audience she needs to persuade is sufficiently small. I characterize the sender-optimal equilibrium and the benefit of not having to persuade your whole audience in separable environments. I also analyze different applications and verify that the results are robust to some perturbations of the model, including non-transparent motives as in Crawford and Sobel (1982) , and full commitment as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
A politician running for office only needs half plus one of the votes. A seller with a capacity constraint only needs to persuade a certain number of consumers to purchase her product. A person looking for a job may apply to many positions, but she only has to convince a single firm to extend an offer. This paper studies the problem of an informed sender who can engage in private conversation with many receivers and cares about the behavior of some but not all of them. My main finding is that having to persuade only part of an audience significantly facilitates information transmission and increases persuasion power.
Let us examine the first example in more detail. Suppose a politician (the sender, she) is running for office. All voters (the receivers, he) share the same preferences. The unknown state of the world equals either 0 or 1. Each voter will vote for the politician if his expectation about the state of the world is greater than 1/2. The voters share a common prior expectation in the interval (1/3, 1/2). Suppose that the politician learns the true state of the world, and can engage in private cheap talk with each voter via targeted ads. I claim that, if there electorate is large enough, then there exists an equilibrium in which she wins the election for sure, regardless of the state. This is possible because the politician only needs to persuade half plus one of the electorate in order to win the election. She can do so with the following strategy. If the state is indeed 1, then she will let every single voter know this fact. If the state is 0, then she will randomly choose half plus one of the voters and tell them that the state is 1, despite the fact that it is not.
A voter that receives a message saying that the state equals 1 knows that this could be a lie. However, he also knows that he would be more likely to receive this message if it was actually true. Hence, the message conveys some information. When the population is large enough, it conveys sufficient information to overturn prior beliefs arbitrarily close to 1/3. In that case, every voter who receives this message prefers to vote for the politician.
I study a general cheap-talk model with many ex-ante homogeneous receivers and both public and private communication. I depart from the literature by assuming that there are n receivers, but the sender only cares about the highest n 0 < n actions taken. In such cases, the utility of the sender can be completely determined by strict subsets of the receivers. Thus, she only needs to persuade part of her audience in order to maximize her utility. I call the gap between n and n 0 an excess audience.
I find that the sender can influence the behavior of receivers in equilibrium in a very wide class of environments as long as there is an excess audience (Proposition 4). In some environments, effective information transmission is only possible if there is an excess audience (Proposition 6). When the fraction of the audience that the sender cares about is small enough, she can achieve her preferred outcome in equilibrium (Proposition 3). I characterize the sender's benefit from having an excess audience under a separability assumption (Theorem 5). Lipnowski and Ravid (2018) characterize the sender's maximum equilibrium payoff when the sender cares about her entire audience in terms of her value function. The value function is the highest payoff the sender can obtain when all the receivers behave optimally given their posterior beliefs. Under Lipnowski and Ravids' assumptions, the sender's maximum equilibrium payoff equals the quasiconcave envelope of her value function. I find that an additional step is needed in the presence of an excess audience.
This step involves a generalization of the politician's communication strategy described above. The sender starts by randomly and privately splitting her audience into a target audience that she wants to persuade, and the rest of the receivers. Receivers in the target audience always receive whichever message induces the behavior most favorable to the sender. The communication strategy for the rest of the receivers is chosen to maximize the credibility of the message sent to the target group. This message conveys information because individual receivers are not told whether they were assigned to the target audience.
This kind of strategy allows the sender to implant a fixed posterior belief in a fixed proportion of the audience regardless of the state. I say that such beliefs are attainable. The set of attainable beliefs admits a simple and computationally tractable characterization (Lemmas 1 and 2). When the sender wishes to persuade her entire audience, the only attainable belief is the prior. However, the set of attainable beliefs is strictly increasing with the size of the excess audience. The missing step to characterize the sender's maximum equilibrium payoff is to replace the original value with the maximum value over the set of attainable beliefs.
The benefit from having an excess audience is always non-negative. It is strictly positive for some prior beliefs. And it is monotone in the fraction of the audience that the sender wishes to persuade. Moreover, as the fraction of the audience that the sender cares about converges to zero, the set of attainable beliefs totally covers the interior of the simplex. Consequently, the maximum equilibrium payoff approaches the best feasible payoff for the sender (Proposition 7).
Section 4 applies the techniques developed in the paper to analyze the election example, financial advice, and the role of advertisement for crowdfunding. Section 5 considers two extensions of the model. First, I analyze a model with full commitment as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and the information design literature (Bergemann and Morris, 2016, Taneva, 2019) . I find a characterization of the maximum sender equilibrium payoff in the full-commitment game, assuming that the state space is finite. The characterization is similar to the one for the cheap-talk game. The only difference is that it uses the concave envelope of the value function instead of the quasiconcave envelope. I also analyze an example with the classic quadratic loss functions from Crawford and Sobel (1982) . This example does not satisfy all the assumptions required for my characterization. However, it is still possible to use strategies with a random target audience in order to transmit information. When the fraction of the audience that the sender cares about is small, the sender can approximate her preferred outcome and transmit large amounts of information to most of her audience in equilibrium. Unlike the case without an excess audience, information transmission is possible for any degree of bias.
Since the seminal work of Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel, different authors have found different mechanisms for an expert to gain credibility. Information transmission is possible via cheap talk when incentives are not too misaligned, or there are multiple senders (Battaglini, 2002) , or multiple dimensions of information (Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2010) , or strategic complementarities (Levy and Razin, 2004, Baliga and Sjöström, 2012) , or the sender has transparent motives (Lipnowski and Ravid, 2018) , among other reasons. An excess audience is a novel mechanism which allows for information transmission in some settings in which none of the aforementioned mechanisms operate.
Some authors have studied cheap-talk communication with multiple audiences. However, this literature has focused on situations when the sender cares about the actions of all receivers, either directly or indirectly. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) showed that senders with multiple audiences sometimes prefer public communication and sometimes private communication. Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) show that the sender might be strictly better off by combining both types of messages. Hence, I allow the sender to use both private and public messages. Basu et al. (2018) study the problem of an informed sender who employs cheap talk to try to prevent an ethnic conflict. Their model has a large audience, and the sender is allowed to use private messages. However, they restrict attention to strategies that are anonymous, conditional on observed heterogeneity. This restriction precludes the strategies with random target audiences that I analyze. Instead, they exploit preference complementarities in order to find an equilibrium with effective information transmission.
There is a large body of literature using cheap talk to study information transmission between politicians and electorates, dating at least as far back as Harrington (1992) . Some recent work in this area includes Schnakenberg (2015) , Panova (2017 ), Jeong (2019 , and Kartik and Van Weelden (2017) . Other recent papers analyze the problem from the information design perspective, including Alonso and Câmara (2016) , and Chan et al. (2019) . Within this literature, the papers that assume talk is cheap focus on public messages. My contributions highlight the importance of private anonymous communication (e.g., through social media).
Model
There is one sender s, and a set of receivers r ∈ R = {1, . . . , n}. The sender and receivers share a common prior belief π 0 about the true state θ 0 ∈ Θ. The sender learns the state. She then sends a private message m p r ∈ M to each receiver r, and a public message m 0 ∈ M 0 to all receivers. Each receiver observes the compound message m r = (m 0 , m p r ), but observes neither the state nor other receivers' private messages. Then, all receivers observe an uninformative public sunspot ω 0 distributed uniformly on [0, 1] . Finally, each receiver r chooses an action a r ∈ A. All receivers have identical preferences. The utility of r depends only on his own action and the state. It is given by u R (a r , θ). The sender's utility u S (a 1 , . . . , a n ) does not depend on the state. I impose some technical restrictions. 1 Each of A, Θ and M is a compact separable metric space containing at least two elements. M 0 and M are rich 1 I adopt the following notational conventions throughout the paper. For each separable metric space Y , B Y denotes the Borel σ-algebra on Y , and ∆Y the set of probability measures on (Y, B Y ) endowed with the weak* topology. Given measures π, τ ∈ ∆Y , π ≪ τ denotes absolute continuity, π ∼ τ denotes equivalence, and dπ/dτ denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative of π with respect to τ . The support of π is denoted by supp π. Given a set X, a function g : X → ∆Y , a point x ∈ X and an event
. Profiles of elements of X are denoted by x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n . Throughout the paper, "a.s." means "almost surely with respect to π 0 ". enough as to not restrict the set of equilibrium outcomes.
2 The utility functions are continuous. I study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. Communication strategies, receiver strategies, and updating rules are measurable maps µ :
, and β r : M 0 ×M → ∆Θ, respectively. Let µ r ( · |θ) denote the marginal distribution over m r induced by µ(θ). Let BR(π) be the set of actions that maximize Θ u R (a, θ) dπ(θ). An equilibrium is a tuple (α, β, µ) consisting a profile of receiver strategies, a profile of updating rules, and a communication strategy, such that (i) For every receiver r, β r is consistent with Bayes' rule given µ r and π 0 .
(ii) α r (m, ω) ∈ A * (β r (m r )) for every receiver r and compound message m r .
(iii) For every message profile m ∈ M 0 × M n , if there exists a state θ such that µ(m|θ) > 0, then m maximizes
Pivotal part of the audience
Throughout most of the paper, I maintain the assumption that the sender only cares about the tail of the empirical distribution of actions taken by the receivers.
Assumption 1 A ⊆ R and there exists an integer n ′ such that for every pair of
where a (i) denotes the i-th order statistic of a.
Define the pivotal number of receivers to be the smallest integer n 0 ∈ {0, . . . , n} that satisfies the condition from Assumption 1. The pivotal fraction of the audience is γ 0 = n 0 /n. The sender's utility only depends on the highest n 0 actions taken by the receivers. If n 0 = 0, then the sender is indifferent between all outcomes. If n 0 = n, then the sender cares about the entire empirical distribution of receiver actions, but not about the identity of the receivers taking each action. If 0 < n 0 < n then the sender cares about persuading fewer receivers than she can talk to. In that case, I say that there is an excess audience.
Example 1 Recall the election example from the introduction. Letting a r = 1 denote a vote for the sender and a r = 0 a vote against her, the outcome of the election is determined by the median action. If n is odd, then n 0 = (n + 1)/2 and γ 0 = (n + 1)/2n. See Section 4.1 for more on this example.
Example 2 Suppose that the sender is the owner of a coffee shop from a local franchise T . The shop is located at a tourist destination with several shops from the same franchise. Most of the potential customers are travelers who are unfamiliar with the franchise and will buy coffee from it at most once. The utility of a potential customer equals θ 0 if they buy a coffee at one of the coffee shops (a r = 1), and 0 otherwise (a r = 0). The sender's profit is normalized to equal the number of customers she serves. She can talk with n passing-by receivers, but she can serve at most n 0 of them. Receivers who choose a r = 1 but are beyond the capacity of the sender, will buy their coffee at a different shop from the same franchise. Therefore,
Attainable posteriors
This section discusses two technical lemmas that drive the rest of the results. Readers interested in the main results can skip to Section 3. A key step in my analysis is to determine the maximum influence that the sender can exert over the beliefs of part of her audience. If the sender wants to guarantee that there are always n 0 receivers having certain posterior beliefs, what values can these posteriors take? (ii) For every state θ and every message profile m in the support of µ(θ), there exists a set T ⊆ R such that T ≥ nγ and β r (m r ) = π for all r ∈ T .
Say that π is γ-attainable if there exist µ and β that γ-attain it. Let Π(γ) be the set of γ-attainable beliefs. The following lemma characterizes the set of γ-attainable beliefs using a set of linear restrictions on likelihood ratios.
Lemma 1 For all γ ∈ (0, 1] and π ∈ ∆Θ, the following statements are equivalent
Lemma 1 implies that Π(γ) is a nonempty closed and convex polytope. Note that all possible posterior beliefs are 0-attainable, and only π 0 is 1-attainable. All the proofs are in the appendix. The following example shows one way to reach the bounds from (ii).
Example 3 Suppose that Θ = {0, 1} and fix some γ = k/n with k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Identify each π ∈ ∆Θ with the probability p := π(1). The only two non-trivial events to consider are {1} and {0}. Hence, part (ii) of Lemma 1 implies that a belief is γ-attainable if and only if
After some simple algebra, this implies that the set of γ-attainable beliefs corresponds to
The upper bound in (2) 3 Condition (iii) is a stronger version of the condition from Theorem 2.1 in Diaconis and Zabell (1982) . They find that a posterior belief π is consistent with a prior π 0 and Bayes' Rule if and only if π ≪ π 0 and dπ/dπ 0 ≤ c 0 a.s. for some c 0 > 0.
From Bayes' rule, the posterior belief β r (1|m ′ ) equals the upper bound of (2).
Since at least k receive message m ′ , this belief is γ-attained.
Lemma 2 below asserts that each extreme point of Π(γ) corresponds to a partition of states into only two blocks. States in one block have increased likelihoods relative to the prior, and states in the other block have decreased likelihoods. This characterization makes Π(γ) computationally tractable. It is particularly advantageous in monotone environments when the sender would always prefer to increase the receivers' beliefs about the state.
Lemma 2 For any γ ∈ (0, 1], a belief π ∈ ∆Θ is an extreme point of Π(γ), if and only if there exists an event
Example 4 (1970) implies that the maximum is attained at an extreme point of Π(γ). Lemma 2 thus implies that the maximizer π * takes the form (3), and it must be the case
This expression is maximized when θ 1 = 1/(1 + √ γ), and the maximum is
Note that this maximum equals 1/2 when γ = 1, equals 1 when γ = 0, and is strictly decreasing in γ. 
Information transmission and persuasion

Persuading a small part of an audience
It is possible to exert great influence over very small fractions of an audience. Suppose that the sender's utility is maximized by a constant action profile. Further suppose that this action profile is a best response to a belief π * with a Radon-Nikodym derivative bounded both above and away from zero. Lemma 1 implies that π * would be γ-attainable for sufficiently low values of γ. Hence, when the sender only cares about small fractions of her audience, she would be able to reach her preferred outcome in equilibrium. Formally,
Assumption 2
There exist an action a * and a belief π * such that a * ∈ BR(π * )
and u S (a * , . . . , a * ) ≥ u S (a) for every action profile a.
Assumption 3 π * ≪ π 0 , and there exist two numbers 0 < ν ≤ν < ∞ such that
Proposition 3 Under assumptions 1-3 there existsγ =γ(π 0 , π * ) ∈ (0, 1) such that if γ 0 ≤γ, then the game admits an equilibrium in which the sender obtains her preferred outcome.
Effective information transmission
I have assumed that the sender has transparent motives, in that her preferences do not depend on the state and are thus common knowledge. Cheap-talk models with transparent motives often allow for some information transmission in equilibrium. See, for instance, Theorem 1 in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) and Proposition 1 in Lipnowski and Ravid (2018). The question I address is whether the sender can transmit sufficient information in order to influence the behavior of her audience to her benefit.
Let v 0 denote the sender's value function. That is, v 0 (π) specifies the maximum utility that the sender could obtain if all receivers shared a posterior π and acted optimally,
Say that an equilibrium exhibits effective information transmission if the sender's expected equilibrium payoff is strictly greater than v 0 (π 0 ). An excess audience allows for effective information transmission for some prior beliefs under two mild sensitivity assumptions that rule out trivial cases.
. . , a ′ ) for every action a ′ = a * , and there
and there exist two numbers 
Sender-optimal equilibrium under separability
The sender's maximum equilibrium payoff v * is the maximum utility that the sender can obtain in any equilibrium. This section characterizes v * under the following separability assumption.
Assumption 5 There exist a strictly increasing function U S : A → R such that
The characterization relies on two operators defined on the set of uppersemicontinuous functions from beliefs to sender payoffs. First, env q v is the quasiconcave envelope of v. That is, env q v is the pointwise-minimum, quasiconcave and upper semicontinuous function that majorizes v. Second, att v gives the maximum of v arising from γ 0 -attainable beliefs, i.e.,
where Π(γ 0 , π) is the set of beliefs that would be γ 0 -attainable if π 0 = π. Intuitively, env q v operates by "flooding the valleys" while att v is obtained by "widening the hills." See the left and center panels of Figure 2 in Section 4.2 for an example.
Theorem 5 Under assumptions 1 and 5, v
Lemma 1 implies that att env q v 0 = env q v 0 when γ 0 = 1. Hence, Theorem 5 reduces to Theorem 2 in Lipnowski and Ravid (2018) in that case. However, the two results differ whenever there is an excess audience and the assumptions from Proposition 4 hold. The difference between the results corresponds to the benefit from an excess audience defined in the following subsection.
The benefit from an excess audience and private communication
What happens to the sender's payoff when she has to persuade a larger or smaller fraction of her audience? Proposition 6 below gives sufficient conditions under which an excess audience is necessary for effective information transmission. These conditions are satisfied by the election, excess capacity, and labor market applications in Section 4.
Proposition 6 Under assumptions 1 and 5, if v 0 is quasi-concave and there is an equilibrium with effective information transmission, then there is an excess audience.
Define the benefit from excess audience to be the difference between v * and the maximum equilibrium payoff to the sender in an alternative environment with n 0 = n. It follows from Theorem 5 and Lemma 1 that this benefit equals the difference between v * and env q v 0 (π 0 ). Moreover, Assumption 5 guarantees that both v * and env q v 0 (π 0 ) are measured in the same units. (ii) is strictly positive whenever π 0 ∈ P and γ 0 < 1, and
Consider an alternative model in which the sender can use only public messages. She still cares only about the actions of part of her audience. However, public messages only allow her to persuade either all of the receivers or none of them. The benefit from private communication is the gap between v * and the maximum sender equilibrium value in this alternative model. Without private messages, the only γ 0 -attainable belief is the prior. Hence, the benefit from private communication coincides with the benefit from excess audience under Assumption 5.
Examples
Targeted political campaigns
Social media allows politicians to personalize campaign advertising at a low cost. Suppose that the sender is a politician running for office. Each receiver r will either vote for the sender (a r = 1) or against her (a r = 0). The state is either 0 or 1, and voters share a common prior belief with p 0 := π 0 (1) ∈ (0, 1). The sender knows the state and engages in private cheap talk with each receiver via targeted online ads.
The sender wins the election if she obtains a super-majority of at least γ ∈ (0, 1) of the votes. Her utility is 1 if she wins the election, and 0 otherwise. The pivotal number of receivers is n 0 = min{n ′ | n ′ > nγ}. All receivers share the same preferences. Receiver r prefers a r = 1 if and only if his posterior beliefs satisfy p r := π r (1) ≥ η, where η ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed parameter.
When is victory attainable for the politician? She wins the election when the posterior beliefs of at least n 0 voters satisfy π r > η. From (1), there exists a γ 0 -attainable belief satisfying this condition if and only if
In such cases, there exists an equilibrium in which the sender always wins the election regardless of the state. The condition is satisfied whenever: (i) the voters prior attitude towards the sender is positive (p 0 is high), (ii) the voters have a low bar for the sender (η is small), or (iii) the sender only needs a small fraction of votes in order to win the election (γ 0 is small). For the case γ = 1/2 and η = 1/2, (8) reduces to the condition π 0 > 1/3 from the introduction.
Financial advice
The state θ 0 ∈ {0, 1} indicates the winner of a rigged boxing match. The sender is an informed bookie who knows the state and would like to persuade the receivers to place large bets. However, she is time constrained. She can talk with n receivers, but she can handle at most n 0 ≤ n bets. The rest of the bets will be handled by other bookies. The total utility of the sender equals V 0 +ηV 1 , where V θ is the total volume of bets on θ that she handles, and η > 1 is a fixed parameter.
Each receiver starts with the same initial wealth w > 0 and places a bet a r ∈ [−w, w]. A positive bet represents a bet on θ 0 = 1 whereas a negative bet represents a bet on θ 0 = 0. Bets on different states have different exogenous net returns ρ 0 , ρ 1 > 0, with ρ 0 ρ 1 < 1. Receivers have logarithmic Bernoulli utility functions. For example, a receiver with beliefs π that places a bet on θ 0 = 1 maximizes
subject to a r ∈ (0, w], where p = π(1). This example deviates slightly from our environment because the sender cares about both tails of the distribution of actions. However, the conclusion of Theorem 5 still applies. The receivers' best response correspondence is given by
The function att v 0 can be computed by substituting the bounds from (2) into u S (BR(p)). Figure 2 illustrates env q v 0 (left), att v 0 for γ 0 ∈ {1/3, 1/10} (middle), and v * for γ 0 = 1/3 (right). The gap between the envelopes in the left and right panels corresponds to both the benefit from private communication and the benefit from having more receivers than capacity to take bets. This example can also be interpreted as the problem of a time-constrained financial adviser who takes prices as given and sells multiple negatively correlated instruments.
Crowdfunding
The sender owns a start-up company financed via an online crowdfunding platform. The receivers are potential backers. Each receiver pledges an investment level a r ≥ 0. Say that the company is backed if r∈R a r ≥ η, where η > 0 is a 
if the company is backed, and u R (a r , θ) = −e −w otherwise. Lemmas 1 and 2 can be used to construct equilibria in which the sender benefits from having an excess audience. Note that the company will be backed if at least n ′ receivers to pledge at least η/n ′ . If η/n ′ < 1, a receiver who is optimistic enough about θ 0 would be willing to pledge that amount. Optimistic beliefs can be (n ′ /n)-attained as long as n is sufficiently larger than n ′ .
Proposition 8
If n ≥ 12η/wρ 2 , then the crowdfunding game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the company is backed for sure regardless of the state.
Extensions
Information design
Suppose now that the sender chooses and commits to a communication strategy before learning the state of nature. This timing corresponds to the information design paradigm used by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) . See also Bergemann and Morris (2016) . Define a commitment protocol to be a tuple (α, β, µ) satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) in the definition of an equilibrium. The sender's maximum commitment payoff v * * (p) is the maximum utility that the sender can obtain in any commitment protocol. Since every equilibrium is a commitment protocol, Propositions 3 and 4 continue to hold in the game with commitment. Also, it is possible to obtain a geometric characterzation of v * * . Let env v 0 denote the concave envelope of v 0 , that is, the pointwise-minimum, concave function that majorizes v 0 .
Theorem 9 If Θ < +∞ and Assumption 5 holds, then v
Figure 3 illustrates this result for the election example with γ 0 = η = 1/2. The figure on the left panel shows env v 0 , which corresponds to the maximum commitment value without an excess audience (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) . This would also be the maximum commitment value for the sender if she was restricted to use only public messages. The middle panel shows v * = att v 0 . The right panel shows v * * . The benefit from commitment is thus given by the gap between the right and the middle panel. The benefit from an excess audience under commitment is given by the gap between the right and the left panel.
Lack of transparent motives
Assuming that the sender does not care about the state simplifies the analysis and plays a crucial role in the proof Theorem 5. However, an excess audience can still be beneficial even when the sender's motives are not transparent. Consider the classic quadratic-loss game from Crawford and Sobel (1982) , with the twist that the sender faces an excess audience.
The state is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. The receivers take actions in A = [0, 1], and their utility is u R (a r , θ 0 ) = −(θ 0 − a r ) 2 . The sender's utility is given by
where b > 1/4 is a fixed parameter measuring the bias of the sender relative to the receivers. Suppose that the sender is only allowed to use private messages. When n 0 is equal to the total number of receivers, this is a particular instance of the environment studied by Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) . Since all the receivers are biased in the same direction, there are only babbling equilibira. In contrast, when n is much larger than n 0 , there can be effective information transmission.
Proposition 10 For all ǫ > 0, there exists n < ∞ such that whenever n ≥ n the maximum sender equilibrium value in the quadratic-loss game is greater than −ǫ if θ 0 + b ≤ 1, and greater than −b 2 − ǫ otherwise.
The proof is constructive. The sender uses a strategy based on a finite partition of [0, 1] . She randomly splits the receivers into two groups of sizes n − n 0 and n 0 . She then reveals truthfully which block of the partition contains θ 0 to the members of the first group. She misleads the members of the second group so that they choose her preferred action. When n is very large, it is possible to construct incentive compatible equilibria of this sort with very fine partitions.
Closing remarks
When talk is cheap, information transmission requires the sender to be indifferent between all messages she uses. The present work identifies a novel mechanism that can create indifference. When the sender only cares about persuading a strict subset of her audience, she is indifferent between the messages she sends to the rest of the receivers. It is possible for her to gain credibility by being truthful with some receivers while lying to others. This mechanism can greatly facilitate information transmission and increase the sender's power to persuade.
The present work provides a full characterization of the sender-optimal equilibrium assuming that the receivers do not care about each other actions, the sender has transparent motives, and her preferences are monotone and satisfy a separability condition. These restrictions greatly simplify the analysis. They make it possible to characterize the set of equilibria combining the idea of γ 0 -attainability with the techniques from Lipnowski and Ravid (2018). However, they appear to be inessential for many of the results. 
A. Proofs
A.1. Attainable posteriors
Proof of Lemma 1. If γ = 1, then the only belief that satisfies either (i), (ii) or (iii) is π 0 , and it satisfies all three conditions. Hence, for the rest of the proof, suppose that γ ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose that π is γ-attained by some β and µ, and fix any two events E ′ and E ′′ . For each receiver r, let M r be the set of compound messages m such that β r (m) = π, and let χ r be the indicator that m r ∈ M r . Also let χ = r∈R χ r be the number of receivers whose posterior equals π. The prior beliefs π 0 , communication strategy µ, and updating rule β induce a joint probability measure Pr over θ 0 , m r , χ r and χ.
First, suppose that π 0 (E ′ )π 0 (E ′′ ) = 0. Since γ > 0, there exists at least one receiver r such that Pr(M r ) > 0. This implies that π is obtained from π 0 using Bayes' rule. Therefore, π ≪ π 0 and (iii) holds with equality. Now consider the case
where I am using short notation for the events θ 0 ∈ E ′ and m r ∈ M r . Since p ′ is γ-attained by x and β, it follows that
Combining (13) and (14) it follows that
Therefore there exists receiver r ′ such that Pr(M r ′ |E ′ ) ≥ γ and Pr(M r ′ ) > 0.
It follows from Bayes' rule that
Taking the ratio of these equations yields:
which is equivalent to (ii) after rearranging terms. ((ii) ⇒ (iii)) Now suppose that (ii) and take any event E such that π 0 (E) = 0, and thus π 0 (Ω \ E) = 1. It follows that γπ (E) 
Since γ > 0, this implies that π(E) = 0. Since E was arbitrary, this implies that π ≪ π 0 . Hence, dπ/dπ 0 : Θ → [0, ∞) exists by the Radon-Nikodym theorem.
Letν, ν ∈ R + ∪ {∞} denote the supremum and infimum of the support of dp ′ /dπ 0 (θ 0 ), respectively, i.e.,
and
By construction, 0 ≤ ν < ∞, ν ≤ν, and dπ/dπ 0 ∈ [ν,ν] a.s.. Ifν = ν, then (iii) is satisfied by c 0 =ν. Otherwise, there exists ν 1 , ν 2 ∈ R such that ν < ν 1 < ν 2 <ν. I will show that if (ii) holds, then γν 2 ≤ ν 1 for any such pair. Therefore, γν ≤ ν and (iii) is satisfied by c 0 =ν.
Since dπ/dπ 0 is measurable, so are E 1 and E 2 . The wayν and ν were defined implies that π 0 (E 1 ) > 0 and π 0 (E 2 ) > 0. It follows from the Radon-Nikodym theorem that
By a similar argument, it follows that
The fact that ν 2 <ν implies that π 0 (E 2 ) > 0. Hence, we can divide (20) by (22). Doing so yields
where the second inequality follows from condition (ii). Therefore,
The proof is constructive. Suppose that condition (iii) holds and let φ : Θ → R be the function given by
Also, let k = min{n ′ ∈ N | n ′ ≥ γn}. Consider the following communication strategy. The sender always sends the same non-informative public message m 0 = ∅. She chooses a random target audience T ⊆ R consisting of exactly k receivers uniformly from {R ′ ⊆ R | R ′ = k}. She sends the (compound) message m ′ = (∅, m 1 ) with probability 1 to all receivers in T regardless of the state. For each state θ ∈ Θ * , each receiver r not in T receives message m ′ with probability
and with the remaining probability he receives a different fixed compound message m ′′ = (∅, m 2 ).
7
Condition (iii) implies that there exists E * ∈ B Θ such that π 0 (E * ) = 1 and
Therefore, µ is a well defined communication strategy (up to a null event, in which it can be redefined arbitrarily). A receiver r who receives message m ′ does not know whether he belongs to T or not. He thus updates based on the probability
Now, take any event E ⊆ E * such that π(E) > 0 and note that
where the second equality follows because π ≪ π 0 , and thus π 0 (E) > 0; the third one follows from (23), and the last one follows from the Radon-Nikodim theorem. Therefore, using Bayes' rule yields
Since E was arbitrary and π 0 (E * ) = 1, it follows that β r (m ′ ) = π a.s.. Since there are always at least nγ receivers with m r = m ′ , we can conclude that π is γ-attained by β and µ.
The following lemma is an intermediate step to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 11 Given any
Without loss of generality, suppose that π 0 (dp
. However, this implies the following contradiction:
Hence, we can conclude that π is an extreme point of Π(γ).
(⇒) Fix a belief π ∈ Π(γ). Letν, ν ∈ R + ∪{∞} be the supremum and infimum of the support of dπ/dπ 0 (θ 0 ), as defined in (18) and (19). The proof proceeds in two steps. First, I will show that if π 0 (dπ/dπ 0 (θ) ∈ {ν,ν}) < 1, then π is not an extreme point of Π(γ). Second, I will show that if ν = γν, then π is not an extreme point of Π(γ).
Step 1 -Suppose that π 0 (dπ/dπ 0 (θ) ∈ {ν,ν}) < 1. I will show that there exist
Moreover, it follows from the definition ofν and ν
where
Let π ′ and π ′′ be the beliefs given by
where dπ ′ /dπ 0 : Θ → R + and dπ ′′ /dπ 0 : Θ → R + are given by
It is straightforward to verify that dπ/dπ 0 = 0.5dπ ′ /dπ 0 + 0.5dπ ′′ /dπ 0 and, consequently, π = 0.5π ′ + 0.5π ′′ . The first two bounds from (29) imply that
and, by a similar argument π ′′ (Θ) = 1. It follows that π ′ and π ′′ are well defined beliefs and are absolutely continuous with respect to π 0 . From the third bound in (29) it follows that
Therefore, dπ Step 2 -Now suppose that dπ/dπ 0 ∈ {ν,ν} a.s., but ν = γν. Again, I will show that there exist π ′ , π ′′ ∈ Π(γ) \ {π} such that π = 0.5π ′ + 0.5π ′′ . Since the argument is very similar to the one used in the previous step, I will omit some details. From Lemma 1, it follows that ν ≥ γν. Hence, it must be the case that ν > γν > 0. Since γ ≤ 1, this implies that ν =ν. Consider the events E + = {θ | dπ/dπ 0 (θ) =ν} and E − = {θ | dπ/dπ 0 (θ) = ν}. We know that π 0 (E + ) + π 0 (E − ) = 1. Moreover, π 0 (E + ) = 1 or π 0 (E − ) = 1 would only be possible if
Let π ′ and π ′′ be defined as in (31), but with dπ ′ /dπ 0 and dπ ′′ /dπ 0 given by
Using an analogous argument to the one used in Step 1, it is possible to verify that π = 0.5π ′ + 0.5π ′′ and π ′ and π ′′ are well defined beliefs and π ′ , π ′′ ∈ Π(γ).
Proof or Lemma 2. (⇒) Let π be an extreme point of Π(γ). From Lemma 11, there exists a constant c 0 such that dπ/dπ 0 ∈ {γc
In particular, for E = Θ,
Since π(Θ) = 1, it follows that c
(⇐) Suppose that there exists a measurable set E + ⊆ Θ such that π satisfies (3) for every event E ∈ B Θ . I claim that the Radon-Nikodym derivative of π with respect to π 0 is given by
. Indeed, note that for every event E,
Since γc 0 ≤ dπ/dπ 0 (θ) ≤ c 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, the result follows from Lemma 1.
A.2. Effective communication and persuasion
Proof of Proposition 3. The threshold is given byγ = ν/ν ∈ (0, 1).
,ν] a.s.. Lemma 1 thus implies that π * is γ 0 -attainable by some β and µ. Consider any strategy profile α such that all receivers choose best responses and, in particular, α r (m r , ω) = a * whenever β r (m r ) = π * . The tupple (α, β, µ) constitutes an equilibrium. Let a be any action profile that results with positive probability in this equilibrium. By construction, at least γ 0 of the receivers satisfy a r = a * . Hence, it maximizes the sender's utility.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let P * = BR −1 (a * ) be the set of beliefs in ∆Θ for which a * is a best response. Also, for each λ
And letλ = sup Λ * andπ = πλ. λ * is well defined an belongs to [0, 1] because 0 ∈ Λ * , and thus Λ * = ∅.
with respect to the weak topology toπ and, consequently, with also with respect to the weak* topology. Since u R is continuous, P * is closed. Since π λ k (E) ∈ P * for all k,π ∈ Λ * . Moreover, since P * is convex, so is Λ * . Therefore, we can write
Assumption 4 implies that π ′ ∼ π * and, consequently, π λ ∼ π λ ′ for all λ, λ ′ ∈ When γ 0 < 1 and Θ < +∞,π belongs to the interior of Π(γ 0 ,π). Therefore, there exists an open neighborhood P ′ ⊆ Π(γ 0 ,π) ofπ such thatπ ∈ Π(γ 0 , π) for all π ∈ P ′ . Sinceπ belongs to the boundary of P * , it follows that P ′′ = P ′ \P * = ∅.
Since P * is closed, P ′′ is open. And, from the same argument we used for π λ , it follows that for every π ∈ P ′′ there exists an equilibrium with effective information transmission. Hence, P ′′ ⊆ P .
A.3. Sender-optimal equilibrium
Lemma 12 Every equilibrium value can be attained by a symmetric equilibrium (α, β, µ) with α r = α r ′ , β r = β r ′ , and µ r = µ r ′ for all receivers r and r ′ .
Proof. Suppose that an equilibrium value u * S is generated by some equilibrium (α, β, µ). Consider the alternative strategiesμ andα obtained by shuffling identities as follows. First, the sender draws a message profile m ∈ M 0 × M n using the original distribution µ, but does not deliver them. Then, she shuffles the identity of the receivers by drawing a permutation uniformly from {I : R → R|I is biyective}. She tells each receiver which function α I(r) (m I(r) , · ) they would have used in the original equilibrium with their swapped identity and message.
Note that α I(r) (m I(r) , · ) would be a best response for r had he been told the shuffling I and the message m I(r) . The sure thing principle then implies that it is also a best response when this information is garbled. The new strategy profile thus induces an equilibrium that yields u * S , and is symmetric.
Lemma 13 (Lipnowski and Ravid (2018) u s (a, . . . , a) , and Θ, A, π 0 , and u R unchanged. Assumption 5 implies that the value function of the alternative environment coincides with the value function of the original environment. Since there is only one receiver, and the sender's utility does not depend on the state, this alternative environment satisfies the assumptions in Lipnowski and Ravid (2018) . Hence, by their Theorem 2, there exists an equilibrium (α 1 ,β 1 ,μ 1 ) which achieves u * S . Consider the replica of this equilibrium given by α r (m 0 , m 0 r , ω) =α 1 (m 0 , ω), β r =β 1 , and µ(m, ∅, . . . , ∅|θ) =μ 1 (m|θ), where ∅ denotes a fixed non-informative private message. Note that this replica uses correlated strategies which guarantee that all agents receive the same message and take the same action with probability 1. It is straightforward to verify that (α, β, µ) is an equilibrium of the original environment and achieves u who receive message m ′ and their actions lead to u * S (because of (48) 
S (because of (48). Hence, env q v 0 (π 0 ) ≥ u * S = att env q v 0 (π 0 ), and the desired inequality v * ≥ att env q v 0 (π 0 )
follows from Lemma 13.
Step 3 (v * ≤ att env q v 0 (π 0 ))-Let u * S be an arbitrary equilibrium value. From Lemma 12, there exists a symmetric equilibrium (α, β, µ) that generates u * S . Let m be a message profile such that µ(m) > 0. Under assumption 5, there must exist a set R(m) with R(m) ≥ n 0 and such that sup{U
for every r ∈ R(m). Let P 0 be the set corresponding set of posterior beliefs,
It follows that
Consider the alternative communication strategy µ ′ with only two (compound) messages m ′ and m ′′ described as follows. The sender first draws a profile m according to µ (but does not deliver it). Receiver r receives message m ′ if and only if r ∈ R(m). Since (α, β, µ) is symmetric,π := β r (m ′ ) does not depend on r.
The martingale property of Bayes' rule implies thatπ ∈ co(P 0 ). Since there are always at least n 0 receivers in R(m), it follows thatπ is γ 0 -attainable. Therefore
The first inequality is just (50). The second inequality follows because env q v 0 majorizes v 0 . The third one because env q v 0 is quasiconcave. The fourth one because infimums are lower bounds. The last one from the fact thatp is γ 0 -attainable. Since, u * S was an arbitrary equilibrium payoff, it follows that v * ≤ att env q v 0 (π 0 ). 
Proof of Proposition
where the first equality follows from (54) and (55), the first inequality from the definition of n ′ and γ, the second equality from simple algebra, the second inequality from ρ < 1, and the last inequality from n ≥ 12η/wρ 2 . Since the project gets backed for sure, the sender has no incentive to deviate and the proposed strategy profile constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. (≤) Let u * S be the expected payoff to the sender from a commitment protocol (α, β, µ). Note that the arguments from the proof of Lemma 12 can be applied to commitment protocols. Hence, we can assume without loss of generality that (α, β, µ) is symmetric. Also, since there is no incentive compatibility constraint for the sender, we can assume without loss of generality that U S (α r (m r , ω)) = v 0 (β r (m r )) for every receiver r, ω ∈ [0, 1] and every message m r such that µ r (m r ) > 0.
For every message profile m such that µ(m) > 0, let R(m) be a set consisting of exactly n 0 receivers such that v 0 (β r (m r )) ≥ v 0 (β r ′ (m r ′ )) for every r ∈ R(m) and r ∈ R(m). Note that
whereπ ( Consider the tuple (α, β, µ) described as follows. The audience is randomly divided into a target set T ⊆ R consisting of exactly n 0 receivers, and R \ T . When the state equals θ, receivers r ∈ T are sent the message m r = k(θ), while, receivers r ∈ T are always sent the message m r = k * (θ). In other words, receivers r ∈ T are truthfully told which block of I K contains θ 0 , while receivers in T are always told that θ 0 ∈ E k * (θ 0 ) , whether this is true or not. The update rules β are derived using Bayes' rule. Receivers choose α r (m r ) = E[ θ 0 |m r ].
Fix K. Since n 0 is also fixed, there existsn such that whenever n ≥n E[ θ 0 |m r = k ] ∈ E k , and k * (θ) = arg min{(
For such values of n, the proposed tuple is an equilibrium and it yields
If θ 0 +b ≤ 1, then θ 0 +b ∈ E k * (θ) and therefore u * S ≥ −1/K. If not, then k * (θ) = K and u * S ≥ −(b + 1/K) 2 .
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